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1 Introduction
We have seen that Africa’s geography has distinctively shaped its opportu-
nities. Two-thirds of Africa’s population live in countries that are either
dominated by natural resource wealth, or are landlocked and resource-
scarce. Both of these conditions are difﬁcult to cope with, and both
are far more common in Africa than in other parts of the developing
world. In this chapter we suggest that not only have Africa’s opportuni-
ties been shaped by its geography, but that to a signiﬁcant extent so have its
choices.
Policy choices do not lend themselves to quantitative analysis: they are
highly multifaceted with no obvious procedure for aggregation, and they
are often continuous but ordinal, lying on the qualitative spectrum better–
worse. In addition, individual variables often measure policy outcomes
rather than policy settings: they become endogenous to growth. We have
reduced this complexity to a manageable set of “syndromes” – patterns
of policy choice that are plausibly causally prior to growth outcomes and
that an economist would expect to be seriously dysfunctional for growth.
This simpliﬁcation has naturally come at the price of a substantial loss of392 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
information. However, as we saw in chapter 2, the syndromes are associ-
ated with a substantial part of Africa’s growth shortfall. If this association is
causal, which we shall investigate, then the loss of information is not overly
severe, at least in terms of the impact of policies on growth. Attention then
properlyshiftstoexplainingpolicychoices,andherethesyndromestructure
provides a powerful focal point for analysis. Under what circumstances did
particular syndromes arise in post-independence Africa, and under what
circumstancesweretheyabandoned?Earlierchapters–includingthewhole
of part 2 –h ave already begun the task of explanation. We continue it here
by exploring the conditions under which the syndromes occurred, both
individually and as a group.
In addressing the origins of policy choice we concentrate on the manner
inwhichthosewhooperateintherealeconomy–privatecitizens–canaffect
the behavior of their governments. We focus on the role of interest groups
andpoliticalparties,andparticularlyontheroleofthepartysystem,empha-
sizing not only the role of political parties in representing private interests
but also the impact of the party system on the incentives of politicians. In
addition,weemphasizethesizeandcompositionofwhat,followingRoeder
(1993)andBuenodeMesquitaetal.(2003),wecalltheselectorate:thegroup
that mediates the political life chances of politicians. As stressed by Zolberg
(1966) and Kasﬁr (1976), in post-independence Africa there was a “shrink-
ing” of the political arena: the selectorate narrowed. Following the logic of
AdamandO’Connell(1999)andBuenodeMesquitaetal.(2003),weargue
that as a selectorate diminishes in size, the incentives to engage in redis-
tribution rise; the beneﬁts become more concentrated and the costs more
dispersed, thus leading to a greater demand for redistributive transfers to
thepowerfulfew.Moreover,bythelogicofHumphreysandBates(2005),as
as electorate increases in size, the incentives to form public goods increase
as well; as the number of people that a government must reward rises, it
becomes less expensive to reward them through the provision of a public
goodratherthanthroughthedistributionofprivatepayoffs.Focusingonthe
instruments of representation – political parties and interest groups – and
the changing scope of the selectorate yields, we argue, provides insight into
the origins of the anti-growth patterns of policy-making that characterize
late-twentieth-century Africa.
2B uilding blocks of political geography
Policy choices reﬂect who holds power, what growth opportunities they
face, and what they understand about those opportunities. We consider
these three building blocks of political choices in turn.Endogenizing syndromes 393
2.1 Power structures
The impact of political power structures on policy choices is mediated, we
shall argue, by the concentration, composition, and durability of execu-
tive power. The more concentrated is power, the greater are the returns to
redistribution to the group in power, relative to the public good of inclu-
sive growth. For a given concentration, in turn, the distortions imposed to
achieveredistributiondependonthematchbetweenpoliticalandeconomic
power, so that policy will depend on precisely which group is incumbent.
The expected durability of rule, ﬁnally, affects the incentives of those in
power to sacriﬁce the future for the present.
Anti-growth syndromes, by this logic, are more likely to emerge where
powerishighlyconcentrated,isheldbyeconomicallylessproductivegroups,
and is viewed by those in power as precarious.
In much of Africa, power gradually shifted from being highly diffuse
to being radically concentrated. Its composition, meanwhile, shifted from
groupsthatbroadlyreﬂectedtheinterestsofcitizenstogroupsthatacquired
inﬂuence wholly disproportional to their numbers. Finally, the durability
of African executive power has been distinctively bimodal: many leaders
have ruled only brieﬂy, but many have ruled for decades. In this section,
we explore the motive forces and implications of this evolution by track-
ing a “representative” political system over the decades following the end
of colonial rule. We focus on the manner in which changes in the struc-
ture of representation and the size of the selectorate altered incentives for
policy-making. Our purpose in following this ﬁctive polity through its four
canonical stages – starting and ending with constitutional democracy – is
to advance a line of argument. At the end of the chapter, we move from
conjecture to evidence, making use of data from our sample of countries
in the post-independence period to test hypotheses advanced in this and
subsequent sections.
2.1.1 Stage 1: constitutional democracy in conditions of ethnic identity
Our representative polity embarks upon independence with a constitution
that, formally at least, is democratic. Power is diffused across the electorate
as parties compete for votes. The selectorate is large: to win a party needs to
attractthesupportofatleast50percentoftheelectorate.Politicianstherefore
have strong incentives to champion the delivery of national public goods.
Some countries – Botswana, Mauritius, and Senegal, for example –
remained at this stage throughout.
If voters identify with ethnic groups, a cost-effective way of forming a
political party may be to base it on ethnic allegiance rather than upon a
program that is nationally appealing. Thus the chapter on Uganda that394 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
appearsinvolume2(KasekendeandAtingi-Ego2007):thegoverningparty
(the United People’s Congress, UPC, headed by Milton Obote) drew solid
electoral support from the Acholi and Langi in the North while the Kabaka
Yekka and the Democratic Parties drew their support from kingdoms in
the south. Thus, too, the case of Nigeria (Iyoha and Oriakhi 2007), where
immediately after independence three major parties competed for power,
eachbasedonamajorethno-regionalgroup:theHausa–FulaniintheNorth,
the Yoruba in the West, and the Ibo in the East.
Inac ompetitive political setting, political parties face a choice between
offeringprogramsthatfeaturenationalpublicgoodsandprogramsthatoffer
ethno-regionalgoods.Shouldsomepartiesofferregionalpublicgoods,then
the nationally oriented parties face the prospect of free-riding. It is rational
for each ethnic group to vote for its “own” party, even though all groups
would gain were they to vote for parties that championed the provision of
nationalratherthanregionalpublicgoods.Incompetitivepoliticalsettings,
regionalpublicgoodsmaythereforecrowdoutnationalpublicgoodsinthe
political marketplace.
Implicitly, at least, much of the literature on post-independence politics
stops at this point: electoral competition, it argues, leads to ethnic capture
asofﬁce-seekingpoliticianstrimtheirpolicyplatformstothepreferencesof
their constituencies.1 Butc onsideration of the size and partitioning of the
selectorate suggests a more nuanced account, including the circumstances
underwhichthechampioningofredistributive,sub-nationalpoliticalagen-
das will be most likely.2
Theincentivetoadoptethno-regionalpoliticsratherthannationalpublic
goodsdependsinpartupontheethniccompositionofthepopulation.Ifthe
majority of the population is from a common ethnic group, as in Botswana
(Werbner 1993), then there is little incentive for ethno-regionalism: even
were the ethnic majority to use its power for redistribution, it would be
too large to secure big gains. Conversely,i f the society is ethnically highly
fragmented, as in Tanzania (Norris and Mattes 2003), in a majoritarian
political system, no ethnic party could credibly gain from political redistri-
bution. The incentive for ethno-regional politics may therefore peak when
there are a few large groups, each able to become a substantial political
force. The impetus may intensify insofar as the groups are polarized –
that is to say, internally compact but with large differences between them,
so that differences between groups become salient relative to differences
within.
1 See the contributions in Rothchild and Olorunsula (1983).
2 The contributions of Posner are highly relevant to this line of analysis; see, for example,
Posner (2005).Endogenizing syndromes 395
Thereareadditionalreasonsforlocatingthe“dangerzone”attheinterme-
diate level of ethic concentration. As stressed by Fearon and Laitin (1996),
Collier (2000), and Bates and Yacolev (2002), in a majoritarian electoral
environment high levels of ethnic fragmentation may in fact strengthen
rather than weaken incentives to provide national public goods.3 Although
eachpartywouldliketodeliveronlyregionalpublicgoodstoitsowngroup,
unless it is a majority it will not be able to do so. The ethnic parties would
need to form coalitions. Further, an ethnic group that is initially excluded
fromthecoalitioncanbiditswayintoitbyofferingitsvotesatalowerprice
in terms of ethno-regional public goods than some group in the coalition.
Hence, in an ethnic democracy, while parties would like to deliver regional
public goods to their own group, they may be driven to supplying national
public goods as the only thing that they can agree upon.
Further, we have already seen that if the winning ethnic party does not
need to form a coalition because it is a large majority, it will not have much
incentive to favor regional public goods over national public goods. Hence,
the danger zone for democratic politics would be where the largest ethnic
group forms a small majority of the population, – large enough to control
the polity but small enough for it to be worthwhile sacriﬁcing the national
for the ethnic interest. This phenomenon is termed “ethnic dominance.”
We would thus predict that under conditions of ethnic dominance even
democratic politics would not deliver national public goods.4
2.1.2 Stage 2: single-party systems
As documented in chapters 9 and 10,w ithin a decade after indepen-
dence,moststatesinAfricaabandonedmulti-partysystemsofgovernment.
Roughly 50 percent adopted single-party systems; over 30 percent no-party
systems;5 while fewer than 20 percent gave legal sanction to the formation
of opposition parties. In one-third of the cases, the military seized power;
when they did so, they tended to suspend the holding of elections and to
outlaw the formation of parties.
In termso f the framework advanced in this chapter, the end of party
competition led to a change in both the system of representation and the
sizeandcompositionoftheselectorate.Interestgroups,ratherthanpolitical
parties, dominated the process of representation; the selectorate narrowed;
and the result of both was an intensiﬁcation of the incentives to employ
public policy to seize wealth rather than to foster its creation.
3 Note the contrast with Easterly and Levine (1997) and Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999).
4 Foraformal model of the conditions under which parties will appeal to “ethnic” as
opposed to “national” interests, see Penn (2006).
5 That is, systems of personal rule.396 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
Returning to our representative state, we can follow the impact upon
the policy-making elite of the termination of party competition. Our
illustration assumes a change from a competitive to a single-party system.
But the arguments linking changes in the party system to changes in policy
preferences would apply as well to a shift to a no-party system – i.e. one
ruled by a big man and his cronies.
With the abandonment of multi-party democracy, the incentive for the
ruling party to appeal to a mass base diminishes. Rather, depending upon
the arrangements for internal party democracy, the maximum require-
ment is that the leader retain the support of the majority of the original
party. Whereas to win the ﬁrst election the leader needed to secure the
support of at least 50 percent of the electorate, he now needs as little as
25 percent.
Twogroupslosefromthebanningofoppositionparties.Oneisthevoters
who supported these opposition parties, potentially 50 percent of the elec-
torate.Inmulti-party,coalitionpoliticsthesegroupsarenotpowerless:they
retain the power to bid themselves into the ruling coalition by demanding a
lower price than some group already in the coalition. The banning of rival
parties essentially removes this right to bid into the ruling group.
The other groups that lose power reside within the ruling party. The
President needs to retain the support of the party, but not its universal
support. Even if internal party structures are democratic, he is compelled
to retain the support of only half of the voters who originally supported the
party. Thus, supposing the party to have gained 50 percent of the votes, the
President now has to retain the support of only 25 percent of the national
electorate.
One result of the change in the party system, then, is that the selectorate
shrinksinsize.Anotheristhattheincentivesthatshapepolicieschange.The
President and his remaining supporters are now in a position to set policies
so as to beneﬁt the 25 percent support they need to retain in order to rule.
To the extent that internal party structures are less than fully democratic,
therulinggroupmaybeabletoretainpowerwhilebeingsupportedbyeven
less than half of the original party.
If the ruling faction of the single party is ethno-regional, regional public
goodsnowbecomeamoreefﬁcientwayoftargetingbeneﬁtstothe25percent
than national public goods, which wastefully also beneﬁt the remaining 75
percentwhoarenowdisempowered.Themoreethno-regionallyfragmented
isthesociety,thenarrowerthesupportbaseofasinglepartyislikelytobe.As
inthecaseofBurundi(NkurunzizaandNgaruko2007)orinMobutu’sZa¨ ıre
(Nzongola-Ntanlaja 2002), the support base of the President may narrow
to his district, his co-ethnics, or his family. The narrower the support base,
the stronger the incentive for regional as opposed to national public goods.Endogenizing syndromes 397
Hence, the more ethnically fragmented the society, the more damaging
would we expect to be the move from competitive party politics.6
When representation is achieved through electoral competition, num-
berscount.Becausepoliticianshaveanincentivetorecruitsupporters,large
groupsbecomeinﬂuentialevenifwidelyscattered.Andbecausepoliticalpar-
ties bear the costs of organizing, these groups can be powerful even though
they are poor. When interest groups, rather than political parties, represent
the interests of citizens, however, then the political advantage shifts.7 In
particular, it shifts in favor of minorities and especially wealthy minorities.
Geographically,thecostsoforganizingarelowerthemoreconcentratedthe
group;largegroupsthatliewidelyscatteredarelesslikelytoformorganized
interests. Economically, industries in which production is concentrated are
morelikelytoexertpoliticalpressure;whenaﬁrm’sdecisionscanaltermar-
ketp rices, it can perceive the beneﬁts that can be derived from collusive
agreements.
It is the politicians who provide the regulations that lead to the restruc-
turingofmarkets.Themorewealthytheinterests,thebettertheycanafford
to payfortheservicesofpoliticians.Inexchangeforﬁnancialcontributions
from businesses, members of the ruling group forge licensing agreements,
impose restrictions on trade, and regulate prices in markets. Escaping the
pressures of market competition, businesses gain the power to restrict out-
put and set prices and thereby secure greater proﬁts than would be possible
inacompetitivemarket.Themassoftheconsumerspaythecosts.Becauseof
thechangeinthesystemofrepresentation,thepowerofnumbersisreduced;
intheabsenceofelectoralcompetition,themajoritycannotsecureachange
inthepoliciesthatbeneﬁttheconcentratedminority.Oneresultistheadop-
tion – or retention – of the kinds of policies that we have characterized as
“control” or “redistributive” regimes (see chapters 3, 4, and 6). Another is
the creation of a narrow elite, in which wealth melds with power.
Note a basic problem with this account: as 75 percent of the population
loses out from this transition, the change should be blocked, especially as
it takes place while under majority rule. How, then, could so many states
abandon competitive party systems?
Onereasonisthatpeoplemayhavemisreadtheimplicationsofthemove
to single-party rule. The political opposition may recognize that they may
lose the power to bid themselves into the ruling coalition. But the half of
the winning coalition that is due to lose its power may be deceived into
thinking that it is actually gaining power at the expense of the 50 percent
6 Subject to a qualiﬁcation discussed below concerning resource rents.
7 See Olson (1977), Becker (1983), and Adam and O’Connell (1999); for an application to
Africa, see Bates (1981).398 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
who will undoubtedly lose it. As noted in the chapter by Mwanawina and
Mulungushi (2007), such appears to have been the case in Zambia. The
Bemba-speaking politicians from the Northern Province had been among
the most militant supporters of the United National Independence Party
(UNIP), the governing party. They had vigorously campaigned on behalf
of the formation of a single-party state. But, when UNIP became the sole
legal party, then found themselves marginalized by a coalition based in the
Eastern Province and were later excluded from power.
Secondly, few of the parties that ended up with power in Africa had
campaigned on a program of national public goods. Elections had been
contested by parties based on ethnic–regional coalitions. Hence, the switch
from the championing of national programs to the sponsorship of ethno-
regional “club” goods was not a difﬁcult one. For many in the governing
party, even those who were eventually marginalized, it represented a return
toafamiliar – and appealing – political formula.
Third, the leaders that presided over the transition to one-party or no-
party states invariably argued that multi-party competition would validate
anddeepenexistingethno-regionalcleavages,andtherebyunderminepolit-
icalandeconomicprogress.Ourownargument–alongwiththoseofAzam
in chapter 6 and Bates in chapter 7 –g ives more credence to this under
conditions of polarization than when fractionalization is high. Experience
suggests,however,thatthepoliticalvalenceofanappealfor“nationalunity”
may be robust to these distinctions of degree.
Lastly, resistance to political restructuring was costly. For some, it meant
forgoingrewardsforcompliance:ajobastheheadofaparastatalorajunior
ministry, for example. For others, it meant running the risk of ﬁnancial
losses or physical harm. Presidents are powerful; they control the means of
rewardingorpunishingothers;andtheycouldselectivelytargetsanctionsso
as to disorganize those who opposed the suppression of party competition.
Theycouldanddidmakeitprivatelyadvantageousforindividualopponents
toendorsepolicychangesthatwouldbeharmfultotheoppositionasagroup.
2.1.3 Stage 3: rule by fear
Bythelate1980s,thevastmajority–80percentormore–ofAfrica’spolitical
systems were authoritarian: they were based on no- or one-party political
systems.Thenatureofthepartysystemnarrowedthescopeoftheselectorate,
allowing elites to adopt policies that redistributed income from the mass of
the population to ﬁnance narrowly targeted beneﬁts: proﬁts for protected
industries or regional or ethnic public goods.
Inano- or single-party system, power need not be highly concentrated
in the President. It could be dispersed around a range of interest groups,
with the President having to appease powerful groups or to play them off
against each other. Such appears to have been the case in the early days ofEndogenizing syndromes 399
Moi’s presidency in Kenya, as he played one of the Central Province barons
offagainstanother,orintheearlydaysofsingle-partyruleinZambia,when
President Kaunda sometimes appeared a captive of the powerful politicians
in the Central Committee.
By the ﬁgures employed in our example, 75 percent of the population
were excluded from power. And in particular, in some instances, the ﬁgures
were even greater. In Equatorial Guinea, the Nguema family controls the
government and pockets the earnings of the oil industry. In Rwanda, the
families of Juv´ enal Habyarimana and his wife formed the akasu – the little
house–thatdominatedthegovernment,untiloverthrownbytheRwandan
Patriotic Front (RPF). And as argued by Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2007),
followingthecoupofMicomberoinBurundi,thedenizensofBururiseized
power, retaining it for more than three decades. Power, and the beneﬁts it
could supply, became narrowly concentrated.
A major reason that narrowly based regimes could remain in power is
thattheirleadersruledbyfear.AreviewoftheconductofAfricanpresidents
suggests that in roughly 40 percent of the country-years in our sample, they
based their rule to a signiﬁcant degree on the use of force. Examples would
include Marien Ngouabi in Congo; Hiss` ene Habr´ ei nC had; Siaka Stevens
in Sierra Leone; and Jose Eduardo dos Santos in Angola.
Those who ruled by fear mobilized the coercive apparatus of the state
to jail, kill, or exile political opponents and to intimidate those who might
otherwise be drawn into the ranks of their political opponents. Note, for
example, the commentary of Nguza Karl-i-Bond, the chimerical politician
fromShabaProvinceinZaire(nowDRC),whosememoirsdocumentpolit-
ical practices in Mobutu’s Zaire. As he recounts, when Mobutu convened
an ew Council of Ministers – and he convened many new ones – he gave
as et speech. “The responsibility of the . . . men of state,” Mobutu would
pronounce, “was to know how to guard secrets.” “If we decide to kill some-
one for reasons of state,” he would declare, “it must remain between us”
(Huband 2001: 227). As did other heads of state, Mobutu controlled a vari-
ety of organizations capable of killing “for reasons of state”; these included
the Civil Guard, commanded by his brother-in-law, Kpama Buramoto; the
Special Research and Surveillance Brigade, commanded by General Blaise
Bolozi,alsorelatedtothePresidentbymarriage;theSpecialActionForces,a
paramilitaryunit,commandedbyHonoreNgabandaNzambo-ku-Atumba,
ac lose aide of Mobutu and his chief of intelligence; and the Special Presi-
dential Division, by all accounts the most effective unit of them all, com-
manded by General Nzimbi Ngabale, a “close relative” (Nzongola-Ntanlaja
2002: 154).
Others, such as Mathieu K´ er´ ekou in Benin, presided over a less baroque
security apparatus: a People’s Militia, a Presidential Guard, an army, and
aM inistry of Interior (Allen 1989: 52, 71). While modest in scope by400 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
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Figure 11.2 Rule by fear
comparison with those of Mobutu, the forces at K´ er´ ekou’s disposal suf-
ﬁcedtodetainpoliticalrivals,jailstudents,andtodriveintoexilethosewho
actively opposed his regime. The units were so organized that, in the words
of Allen (1989: 52) they “concentrate[d] the entire repressive apparatus in
the hands of the President.”
Observing the distribution of regimes based on fear, we note that they
tended to prevail in one or no-party systems (ﬁgure 11.1).
The narrow scope of the selectorate in such regimes, in turn, cre-
ates incentives to employ public policies to secure the redistribution of
economic resources. As seen in ﬁgure 11.2,i n states ruled by fear, economic
redistribution constitutes the modal choice of public policy.Endogenizing syndromes 401
HowdidsomeAfricansocietiesgettorulebyfear?Onerouteisa gradual
exclusionfrompowerstartingfromastage-2single-partysystem.Theleader
dismantles whatever checks and balances are in place and replaces party
supporters in positions of power with family members. Newly excluded
supporters have an incentive, as a group, to arrest the process, but face a
free-rider problem: to arrest the process essentially involves challenging the
President,andthisexposesthosemakingthechallengetorisk.Asthesupport
base shrinks below the 25 percent of stage 2, even ethnically speciﬁc public
goods become wasteful relative to private patronage. The redistribution
ceases to be ethno-regional and becomes family-based looting.
Gradual exclusion, in which a single-party system erodes into personal
rule, is not the only means by which rule by fear has evolved, however.
There are two other routes: coups and rebellions. Both place the head of a
hierarchical military organization at the head of the government, and the
President therefore enters ofﬁce with the tools in place to rule by fear.
The only effective threat to this concentration of power comes from a
blocking coalition within the military: that is, a further coup or rebellion.
Theriskofacoupisroughly6percentinstatesruledbyfear;amongothers,
itisroughly4percent,andthedifferenceissigniﬁcantatthe0.01level.Rule
by fear thus associates with political instability. And the combination of
political risk and economic redistribution is costly, lowering the prospects
for growth.
2.1.4 Stage 4: restored democracy
A ﬁnal step, which may come after stages 2 or 3, is the restoration of
democracy. Democracy has two distinct dimensions; electoral competition
(Schumpeter 1950), which is relatively easy to introduce, and checks and
balances(Dahl1971),whicharenot.Bythemid-1990s,one-halfofthestates
of Africa were governed by regimes chosen in competitive elections. More
elusive has been the creation of checks and balances. Whether judged in
termso fe lectoral competition or checks and blances, the nations of Africa
continuetolodgeatthelowerendoftheglobaldistributionofthedemocracy
ratings.Theformofdemocracythattheyexhibitmorecloselyresemblesthe
illiberaldemocraciesofFarheedZakaria(Zakaria1997)thanthepolyarchies
of Robert Dahl (Dahl 1971).
2.1.5 Concentration, composition, and duration: a summary of their
implications for growth
The greater is the concentration of power the greater the incentive for the
group in power to choose the private rewards of redistribution over the
public good of growth. As interest groups come to dominate the process of402 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
representation, their differential abilities to overcome the collective action
problem shape who is going to beneﬁt from redistribution. In Africa, the
biggestsingleindustryisagriculture;butbecauseitwasdominatedbysmall-
holders, once contested elections were banned, the costs of collective action
loweredthepoweroffarmers.Instead,powershiftedtowell-organizedinter-
ests such as public sector employees and large ﬁrms.
When leaders see their position as precarious, their discount rates rise.
Thehigherthediscountratethelowerthepayofftothegainsfromagrowth
strategy,andsothemoreattractiveisredistributionattheexpenseofgrowth.
Superﬁcially,Africanleadersshouldinretrospectusuallynothaveseentheir
positions as precarious: they include many of the longest-serving rulers
in the world and the single-party systems and rule-by-fear systems over
whichtheypresidedeliminatedconstitutionalmeansfortheirreplacement.
However, unconstitutional means of replacement were common through
coups and rebellions. Unlike democratic challenges, these could occur at
any moment: leaders were never safe. Again unlike democratic challenges,
theconsequencescouldbeviolent:videPresidentDoeofLiberia,torturedto
deathbyhispoliticalopponents.Whilefacinganobjectivelylowprobability
of being replaced, and so ending up holding ofﬁce for long periods, leaders
felt endangered.
2.2 Opportunities
Opportunities affect the magnitude and distribution of costs and beneﬁts
of the syndromes.
2.2.1 Landlocked, resource-scarce countries
One of the key choices is between short-term gains to the group in power
and long-term growth for the country as a whole. As argued by Sachs and
Warner (1995), landlocked countries that are resource-scarce simply lack
good growth opportunities. The returns to the choice of a strategy of long-
term national growth are therefore going to be more modest than in other
settings.Realizingthis,thegroupinpowerhasastrongerrelativeincentiveto
opt for redistribution. In keeping with this reasoning, we ﬁnd (ﬁgure 11.3)
that landlocked countries are more likely to have either single-party or no-
partysystemsthanarecoastalregionsorregionsthatareresource-rich;they
aremorelikelythancoastalregionstoberuledbyfear(ﬁgure11.4);andthey
are more likely to exhibit redistributive and less likely to adopt syndrome-
free policy regimes than are coastal or resource-rich nations (ﬁgure 11.5).
Theyarealsomorelikelytoexperiencestatebreakdownandcivilwar(ﬁgures
11.5and11.6),themselvestheresultofattemptstousethepowerofthestate
to engage in, or to protect against, redistribution.Endogenizing syndromes 403
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Figure 11.4 Opportunities and rule by fear
2.2.2 Resource-rich countries
Resource-richcountrieshavethepotentialfornationalgrowthandsodonot
have the same political economy problems of landlocked, resource-scarce
societies.However,becausetheyhavelowlevelsoftaxationtheyarelikelyto
under-supplythepublicgoodofscrutiny,asdiscussedinchapter7.Withlow
scrutiny, rulers are in a position to divert public funds to improper uses. In
the context of democratic competitive electoral politics, this diversion can
make patronage politics ﬁnancially feasible: the massive patronage needed
towinelectionsdespitefailingtodeliverpublicgoodscanbeﬁnancedbythe
resource rents. In this situation, the more competitive is party competition,
themorewillpartiesbedriventospendonpatronage.Thepoliticalequilib-
rium is when the party maximizes the amount of public funds that can be
divertedintopatronage,andthispatronageinturnissufﬁcienttomaintainit
inpower.Indeed,withsufﬁcientlyintensecompetitionthegovernmentwill
need to raid the commons of the future by borrowing in an unsustainable404 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
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way.Hence,wewouldexpectthatinthecontextoflargeresourcerentselec-
toralc ompetition would lead to the syndrome of unsustainable spending.
Large resource rents make the syndrome of unsustainable spending much
morelikelybecausetheyprovidethegovernmentwiththecollateralagainst
which it can borrow.
2.2.3 Coastal, resource-scarce countries
During a part of our period coastal, resource-scarce countries had remark-
able opportunities for growth, namely through breaking into international
marketsformanufactures.Evenwithoutthis,theyhadsuperioropportuni-
ties to the landlocked, resource-scarce countries due to their lower costs of
internationaltrade.Lackinglargenaturalresourcerents,theydonotfacethe
problems of low scrutiny common to the resource-rich. Hence, this group
should have good returns to a strategy for national growth, while having
sufﬁcient scrutiny to impose constraints on patronage. We would thereforeEndogenizing syndromes 405
expect democratic politics in this group of countries to work better than
elsewhere in Africa.
2.3 Inﬂuences on knowledge
Powerstructuresdeterminewhogetstochoose,andopportunitiescombine
with these choices to determine economic payoffs. However, people take
decisions in the context of limited information. Inﬂuences on knowledge
therefore potentially shape choices. We distinguish between three levels of
inﬂuence: in-country, regional, and global.
2.3.1 In-country knowledge
In-countryknowledgecanusefullybedividedintotheknowledgebaseofthe
leaderandtheknowledgebaseofthepopulation.Asarguedinchapters4and
9, many of Africa’s ﬁrst generation of leaders were inﬂuenced by socialism,
whetherinitsFabianorMarxistvarieties.Socialistbeliefsdirectlysuggested
that control regimes were a necessary strategy for economic development.
The knowledge base of the population, which can be proxied by its edu-
cation, might affect political choices in two main ways. First, conditional
upon democracy, a higher level of knowledge might increase the pressure
to choose national public goods over regional public goods and private
patronage. Second, even in the absence of democracy, the more educated is
the population the more rapidly is the society likely to learn from errors.
Hence, we might expect the syndromes to be less persistent the more edu-
cated is the population.
2.3.2 Learning from the region
Potentially, countries can learn from the successes of their neighbors. For
example, in Latin America the Chile model was inﬂuential, while in East
Asia the “gang of four” provided a role model that was widely emulated. In
Africa there is some limited evidence for this: during the 1990s Madagascar
started to copy Mauritius, and Namibia may have copied Botswana. Coun-
tries can also learn from the failure of neighbors: the fact that the ANC was
based in Zambia during a phase of manifest economic failure is sometimes
used to account for the careful economic management that the ANC has
adopted since coming to power in South Africa. We would thus expect the
adoptionandescapefromthesyndromestobeseriallycorrelatedacrossthe
region.
2.3.3 Learning from the world
All societies learn from others. The global fashion for privatization that
startedinthe1980swasclearlysparkedbytheexampleoftheThatchergov-
ernmentintheUK.InAfrica,twomajorworldphenomenaareofsufﬁcient406 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
importance to warrant explicit investigation: the rise of Asia and the fall of
the USSR. The rise of East Asia as a global exporter beginning in the 1980s
provided a new role model for coastal, resource-scarce low-income coun-
tries. Potentially, the success of such countries in Asia revealed to those in
Africa that the cost of the syndromes was higher than they had previously
realized. The fall of the USSR was an important learning event for those
societies with control regimes. Examples of its inﬂuence are that the gov-
ernmentsofEritreaandANCSouthAfricawhichformedshortlyafterwards
did not adopt the socialist model, even though while liberation movements
they had espoused it.
3P redicting the syndromes
Our analysis relates the occurrence of syndromes to the nature of power
structures, opportunities, and inﬂuences on knowledge. To test these
hypothesesempiricallywebeginbypoolingthesyndromesandconsidering
only what determines whether a society is free of them. We then conduct a
similar analysis for the individual syndromes.
3.1 Determinants of syndrome-free status
Table 11.1 presents our analysis of the characteristics that are signiﬁcant
in determining whether a country is free of the syndromes. The statistical
method is logit analysis, with each country-year experience in Africa since
1970 forming an observation. A positive sign indicates a variable which
increases the likelihood that a country will be free of all syndromes. The
estimates have been derived after employing multiple imputation methods
to derive estimates of the values for missing observations.8
We begin with variables that describe power structures, whether via the
political system or the structure of ethnic allegiances. Consider ﬁrst the
variable indicating the mode of representation: “multi-party.” When this
variabletakesthevalue1,theheadofstatewaspickedinanelectioncontested
by competing political parties. When 0, there was a single party or personal
rule, and representation is undertaken by organized interests. The “multi-
party” variable itself is highly signiﬁcant and its coefﬁcient is large and
positive: multi-party competition makes an African country much more
likely to be syndrome-free.
8 We use methods developed by Rubin (1996) and Schafer (1997)t o impute multiple
estimates of the missing values and to calculate their distributions, and techniques
developed by the Harvard Data Center to estimate and to interpret the estimates derived
from the resultant data. See Honaker (2000) and King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000).Endogenizing syndromes 407
Recall our discussion of the role of the size of the selectorate. A mea-
sure would be the degree of ethnic concentration, for which we have two
measures. The ﬁrst is “ethnic dominance,” which takes a value of 1 if the
largest group constitutes 45 percent or more of the population and 0 oth-
erwise. Given such preponderance, our reasoning would suggest, the group
would tend to use the state to promote prosperity through the creation of
collectively rather than privately beneﬁcial policies and through growth-
oriented rather than redistributive measures. As we would expect, the coef-
ﬁcient for this variable is positive, although the level of signiﬁcance is low
(see table 11.1).
As econd measure is ethic diversity, as measured by the probability that
any two people, selected from a country’s population at random, would
belong to different ethno-cultural groups. In this instance, we enter the
variable in interaction with an indicator of “rule by fear.” We do so because
webelievethatwhenminorities,whichinAfricaareoftenethnicallydeﬁned,
seize power, they then use the coercive apparatus of the state to implement
policies of redistribution. The combination of rule by fear and high levels
of fractionalization should therefore produce a signiﬁcantly negative rela-
tionship with syndrome-free policy-making.
To interpret the relevant results in table 11.1, note that “rule by fear”
takes on the values of 1 for present and 0 for absent. Note, too, that the
average level of ethnic fractionalization in the sample set of counties is
0.725, and let the variable take on the values of 0, indicating complete
homogeneity; 0.725, indicating average diversity; and 1, indicating total
fractionalization. Employing the coefﬁcients from the model in column
(1), we note that were the population ethnically homogenous (i.e. when
ethnic diversity = 0), even a government that ruled by fear would adopt
syndrome-free policy-making: the coefﬁcient would be positive and signif-
icant. Given the size and signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcient on the interaction
term,h owever, at the average level of ethnic fractionalization (0.725), rule
by fearexercisesasigniﬁcantlynegativeeffectonthedependentvariable.So
toow hen the measure of fractionalization equals 1. As the level of ethnic
diversityrises,thenrulebyfearimpactsmorenegativelyuponthelikelihood
of syndrome-free policy-making. The results thus suggest that regimes that
possess a narrow ethic base – i.e. that have a small selectorate – are willing
to employ force to distort markets using the power of the state to create and
enforcepubicpoliciesthatsecureredistributionratherthangrowth(seealso
table 11.2,c olumn (1)).
We next investigate the variables that capture economic opportunities.
Thecoefﬁcientsforlandlockedandcoastalresource-scarcevariablesareeach
signiﬁcantandnegative.Notethatthecoastalstateschosepolicyregimesthat
tended to impose regulatory regimes and to engage in redistribution. That
theydidsojustascoastalstatesinAsiaembracedtheinternationaleconomy408 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
Table 11.1 Explaining the syndromes: what keeps countries syndrome-free?
Syndrome-free Syndrome-free Syndrome-free Syndrome-free
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Multi-party 1.176 1.376 1.220 1.093
(0.239)    (0.244)    (0.246)    (0.238)   
Ethnic dominance 0.417 0.290 0.409 0.487
(0.231)  (0.244) (0.231)  (0.242)  
Rule by fear 1.902 2.05 1.916 1.977
(0.513)    (0.505)    (513)    (0.487)   
Ethnic diversity  0.483  0.723  0.482  0.379
(0.754) (0.767) (0.753) (0.760)
Rule by fear    3.889  4.158  3.907  3.915
Ethnic diversity (0.718)    (0.723)    (0.719)    (0.687)   
Accumulated 6.018 10.562 5.851 6.672
knowledge (1.429)    (1.741)    (1.443)    (1.460)   
Landlocked,  1.024  1.029  1.019  0.869
resource-scarce (0.216)    (0.218)    (0.216)    (0.228)   
Coastal,  1.021  0.912  1.018  1.013
resource-scarce (0.205)    (0.205)    (0.206)    (0.208)   
Proportion of nat.  1.650  1.702  1.469  1.581
res. rents in GDP (0.458)    (0.459)    (0.471)    (0.470)   
Trend  0.008 0.029  0.010  0.018
(0.015) (0.017)  (0.015) (0.016)
Secondary 0.059 0.076 0.059 0.048
enrollment in 1970 (0.015)    (0.017)    (0.015)    (0.017)   
Post-1989 1.215 1.552 1.208 1.266
(0.280)    (0.249)    (0.281)    (0.289)   
Average syndrome-  1.839
free for neighbors (0.393)   
Nat.-res. rents    0.571
Multi-party (0.979)
Risk of  8.609
coup d’´ etat (3.748)  
Obs. 1,645 1,645 1,645 1,645
McFadden R2 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.26
Adjusted R2 0.24 0.26 0.24 0.25
Notes:L ogit estimation, p-values in parentheses.
  Signiﬁcant at 10 percent;   signiﬁcant at 5 percent;    signiﬁcant at 1 percent; all regressions include
an intercept.Endogenizing syndromes 409
Table 11.2 Explaining the syndromes individually.
Unsustainable State
Regulatory Redistribution spending breakdown
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Multi-party  0.207  1.130  0.637  0.021
(0.174) (0.264)    (0.349)  (0.297)
Ethnic dominance  0.316  1.30 0.428  1.169
(0.222) (0.264)    (0.352) (0.347)   
Rule by fear 0.444  0.569 0.968  1.808
(0.451) (0.531) (0.691) (0.872) 
Ethnic diversity 1.028  1.917 0.276  3.506
(0.746) (0.836)    (1.096) (1.087)   
Rule by fear    0.815 3.624  0.690 2.911
Ethnic diversity (0.602) (0.709)    ( 0.758) (1.120)  
Accumulated  5.323  1.333  4.679  1.731
knowledge (1.438)    (1.674) (3.494) (1.835)
Landlocked,  0.223 1.293  1.084 0.085
resource-scarce (0.192) (0.218)    (0.326)    (0.243)
Coastal, 0.418 0.580  0.611  0.116
resource-scarce (0.175)   (0.193)    (0.272)    (0.226)
Proportion of nat.-  0.273 2.547 2.312  2.997
res. rents in GDP (0.357) (0.383)    (0.410)    (1.097)   
Trend  0.025 0.007  0.012 0.006
(0.015)  (0.017) (0.037) (0.018)
Secondary  0.146 0.075  0.076  0.068
enrollment in 1970 (0.016)    (0.017)    (0.025)    (0.021)   
Post-1989  1.264  0.301  1.701 1.058
(0.237)    (0.264) (0.500)    (0.305)   
Obs. 1,645 1,645 1,645 1,645
McFadden R2 0.18 0.23 0.21 0.15
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.22 0.19 0.11
Notes:L ogit estimation, p-values in parentheses.
  Signiﬁcant at 10 percent;   signiﬁcant at 5 percent;    signiﬁcant at 1 percent; all
regressions include an intercept.
and adopted growth-promoting polices helped to lay the foundation for
Africa’slong-rungrowthshortfall,asarguedinchapter2.Asanindicatorfor
resourcewealth,weintroduceacontinuousvariable:thevalueoftheresource
rents as a share of GDP. The coefﬁcient on this variable is signiﬁcantly
negative: resource rents systematically make syndromes more likely.
Finally, we investigate a range of knowledge variables. The proportion of
the population aged over twenty-ﬁve that had been educated signiﬁcantly
increases the predicted frequency of syndrome-free status in subsequent410 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
years. We measure cumulative experience by the population-weighted
cumulative proportion of country-years that are syndrome-free. We mea-
sure the impact of neighbours by noting the portion of neighboring states
that are symptom-free at any given time. The ﬁrst is highly signiﬁcant and
the coefﬁcient is positive; the second (see table 11.1,c olumn (2)) is signiﬁ-
cant and negative. The ﬁrst represents learning; the second, efforts to avoid
mistakes made by others.9
ThedatasuggestthatthefalloftheUSSRinﬂuencedpolicychoices.Given
the impact of this and other temporally-speciﬁc variables, the time trend is
insigniﬁcant, though negative.
As shown in table 11.1,c olumn (3), party competition has less effect
in resource-rich countries. While consistent with the hypothesis of the
“resourcecurse”(Ross2003),theﬁndingisnotstatisticallysigniﬁcant.Equa-
tion (4) introduces a measure of coup risk: countries at high levels of risk
from coups are signiﬁcantly less likely to choose a mix of policies that is
“syndrome-free.”
Thecentralconclusionfromthisanalysisisthusthatthesyndromesmove
inconcertwiththethreesetsofinﬂuencesdiscussedintheprevioussections:
the nature of the party system, the size and composition of the selectorate,
and the level of knowledge.
3.2 Syndrome by syndrome
We now consider how each of the syndromes may be induced by particular
power structures, opportunities, and inﬂuences on knowledge.
3.2.1 Redistribution
The redistribution syndrome takes three forms: excessive ethno-regional
redistribution, looting, and inadequate ethno-regional redistribution.
We have suggested that excessive ethno-regional redistribution is more
likely with single-party rule, where power becomes concentrated in a single
minority group, and if there are substantial resource rents, since these are
likely to be regionally concentrated.
Thelootingformofredistributionispredictedtobegeneratedbyruleby
fear, which in turn can develop from single-party rule, coups or rebellions.
Inadequate ethno-regional redistribution occurs where a rich and pro-
ductivegroupwithpowerfailstobuyoffapoorerandpotentiallyaggressive
group, and as a result suffers violent expropriation. At the heart of such a
9 We also investigated whether the rise of East Asian manufactured exports inﬂuenced the
coastal countries. We found no signiﬁcant effect: countries did not change behavior
despite the mounting evidence that they were missing an unprecedented opportunity for
rapid growth.Endogenizing syndromes 411
missedopportunityisanabilitytomakebindingagreements(Acemogluand
Robinson 2001;A zam and Mesnard 2003). Promises by the rich to transfer
resourcestothepoorlackcredibility,giventime-inconsistentpreferences.10
3.2.2 Unsustainable spending and anticipated redistribution
The degree to which countries adopt unsustainable policies is likely to
depend upon the scope for debt accumulation. In turn, this will depend
upon the initial level of indebtedness and the level of exports. Countries
with natural-resource booms are therefore most vulnerable to this syn-
drome. Unsustainable spending – typically generating a period of rapid but
unsustainablegrowth–resultswhenthereisnoinstitutionalcapacitytopro-
tectthe“commons”ofthefutureagainstclaimsmadeinthepresent.When,
as is often the case in Africa, states are weak, the governing group may ﬁnd
it difﬁcult to control the level and rate of current public consumption.
Anticipated redistribution occurs where a ruling group, whether ethno-
regional or looting, has good reason to believe that it will lose power in
the near future. It then has an incentive to asset strip, even if this is costly.
The scope for anticipated redistribution depends in part upon the clarity
of the threat of loss of power, and the extent to which assets can be run
down. Potentially, the group can rund own its net assets position without
stripping assets by borrowing. However, the same information that tells the
group that it risks loss of power may make it non-creditworthy to lenders.
An example is South Africa in the later days of minority rule.
Anapparentlymilderformofanticipatedredistributionwhichmayenable
borrowing,andthuspotentiallybemoredamaging,iswheretherulinggroup
has an unspeciﬁc fear of loss of power, rather than having clear informa-
tion about a speciﬁc threat. Thus, an autocrat may feel insecure due to the
possibility of a coup. This is very different from the urgent end-game that
likely characterized the behavior of the Afrikaners in the late 1980s.
3.2.3 State breakdown
State breakdown occurs as a result of the capturing of political power by
a small, authoritarian minority. One result is the disempowerment and
political alienation of a large percent of the population; a second is the
adoption of redistributive policies. Such outcomes are more likely when
there is a mixture of rule by fear and ethnic fractionalization. There is
some evidence that resource rents make rebellions more likely, though not
coups–perhapsbecause,unlikerebellions,coupsdonotneedtobeﬁnanced.
10 Recall the discussion in chapter 7 where it was shown that, in keeping with the argument
above, where power has shifted into the hands of more resource-scarce regions, there are
lower levels of militarization. This ﬁnding, too, is consistent with an argument that
stresses the importance of credibility; it may ﬁnd its cause in the inability of the richer
regions to make credible promises of redistribution.412 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
3.2.4 Control regimes
Asdiscussedinchapter6,singlepartyruleandrulebyfearbothmakecontrol
regimes more likely. There are also likely to be role-model effects, with the
collapse of the USSR making control regimes much less attractive.
3.2.5 The statistical evidence
We nowlookathoweachparticularsyndromedeviatesfromthecoreregres-
sion,theresultsbeingreportedintable11.2.Becausethedependentvariable
is now a syndrome rather than the absence of syndromes, we should expect
the signs to be the opposite of those observed in table 11.1.
Consider, ﬁrst, the regulatory syndrome. Consistent with the arguments
of chapter 6, the ending of the Cold War, a large proportion of adults with
secondary education, and party competition made the adoption of control
regimes less likely; the last is not statistically signiﬁcant, however. Ethnic
dominance is now insigniﬁcant: the urge to excessive regulation was not
affected by a society having a dominant ethnic group. Coastal economies
weremorelikelytoadoptsuchpoliciesthanwerethosethatwerelandlocked.
Nowconsidertheredistributionsyndrome.Whenthereisadominanteth-
nic group, the incentives to adopt redistributive policies appear to decline.
Rather, the important drivers of the syndrome are ethnic diversity joined
with rule by fear and the existence of rich resources. When opposition par-
ties can openly contest elections, governments are less likely to engage in
redistribution. Somewhat surprisingly, increases in education actually raise
the likelihood of the syndrome.
The major driver of the unsustainable spending syndrome is, unsurpris-
ingly, the magnitude of resource wealth. Ethnic diversity and rule by fear
appeartohavelittlebearingonthelikelihoodofexhibitingthissyndrome.A
moreeducatedpopulationandmulti-partydemocracymakethissyndrome
less likely.
Finally, turning to state breakdown, it is here that the interaction of rule
by fear and ethnic diversity appears to be most potent. In the light of recent
scholarship,itissurprisingtoﬁndthathighlevelsofresourcewealthappear
to reduce, rather than increase, the likelihood of this syndrome.
4C onclusions
We closebyreiteratingourcoreﬁndings.Theformofrepresentationcounts:
it affects the degree to which policy will be used to promote the formation
of national public goods, such as growth, as opposed to targetable “club”
goods, such as ethno-regional transfers or private beneﬁts for the elite.
So, too, does the selectorate: the narrower the selectorate, the greater the
incentives to secure wealth through redistribution rather than growth. AndEndogenizing syndromes 413
the states of Africa have learned: from their own experiences, from the fall
of communism, and from the mistakes of their neighbors.
Appendix: Data used in analysis of syndromes
Table 11.A1 Descriptive statistics.
Variable Mean Std dev. Min Max Obs.
Syndrome-free 0.341 0.012 0 1 1645
Regulatory 0.421 0.012 0 1 1645
Redistribution 0.315 0.012 0 1 1645
Unsustainable spending 0.098 0.007 0 1 1645
State breakdown 0.146 0.009 0 1 1645
Rule by fear 0.410 0.014 0 1 1645
Ethnic dominance 0.277 0.011 0 1 1645
Ethnic diversity 0.725 0.014 0.255 0.953 1645
Accumulated knowledge 0.238 0.001 0.172 0.372 1645
Neighbors’ syndromes 0.323 0.009 0 1 1645
Landlocked, resource-scarce 0.283 0.011 0 1 1645
Coastal, resource-scarce 0.454 0.012 0 1 1645
Proportion of natural-resource 1645
rents in GDP 0.061 0.005 0 1 1645
Trend 28 10.10 11 45 1645
Secondary enrollment in 1970 8.258 0.151 1 30 1645
Multi-party 0.151 0.359 0 1 1645
Coup risk 0.046 0.001 0 0.16 1645
Resource-rich 
Competitive parties 0.034 0.013 0 11.5 1645
Rule by fear 
Ethnic diversity 0.311 0.010 0 1 1645
Post-1989 0.429 0.249 0 1 1645
Sample:A ngola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Cˆ ote
d’Ivoire, DRC, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya,
Lesotho, Liberia, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone,
Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Variables:
Syndrome-free
Takesavalue of 1 if the country is free of any syndrome in the year in
question.414 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
Regulatory
Takesavalueof1ifthecountryiseitherinahardorasoftregulatoryregime.
Redistribution
Takesavalue of 1 if the country is in any of the three variants of the redis-
tribution syndrome.
Unsustainable spending
Takesavalue of 1 if the country is in a phase of the unsustainable spending
syndrome.
State breakdown
Takesav alue of 1 if the country is experiencing state breakdown.
Rule by fear
Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if authority is highly concentrated in a
political leader who indeed “rules by fear.” Source: classiﬁcation by authors.
Ethnic dominance
Takesavalueof1ifthelargestethnicgroupinsocietymakesupbetween45
and 90 percent of the total population. Source: based on Fearon and Laitin’s
(2003) “plural” variable.
Ethnic diversity
This cultural fractionalization measure takes a value of 0 for homogenous
societies, higher values describe more heterogenous societies. The number
isobtainedbydrawingtwopeopleatrandomfromacountryandmeasuring
the probability that they belong to the same culture. Source:F earon (2003).
Accumulated knowledge
Population-weighedaverage(using1980populations)ofthesyndrome-free
status for all countries in SSA. This variable is time-varying but the same
for all countries. Source:a uthors’ calculations.
Neighbors’ syndromes
Average of the syndrome-free status of the country’s neighbors. Source:
authors’ calculations.
Landlocked, resource-scarce
Dummy variable taking a value of 1 for landlocked, resource-scarce coun-
tries. Source:c lassiﬁcation by authors.Endogenizing syndromes 415
Coastal, resource-scarce
Dummy variable taking a value of 1 for coastal, resource-scarce countries.
Source:c lassiﬁcation by authors.
Proportion of natural-resource rents in GDP
Using data from the World Bank’s adjusted savings project we calculated
the rents for each commodity by subtracting the cost from the commodity
price. We then multiplied the rents per unit by the amount extracted and
summed across the different commodities. We then calculated the share of
rentsinGDP.SincetherentsareprovidedincurrentUSdollarsweusedthe
WDI 2003 GDP in current dollars to calculate this share. Natural resources
for which rent data were available are: oil, gas, coal, lignite, bauxite, copper,
gold, iron, lead, nickel, phosphate, silver, tin, and zinc. The data are avail-
able from http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/envext.nsf/44ByDocName/
GreenAccountingAdjustedNetSavings.
Trend
A linear trend term, incremented one unit per year.
Secondary enrollment in 1970
Ratio of number of persons enrolled in secondary school to number of
persons of secondary school age.
Multi-party
Dummyvariabletakingavalueof1ifthecountryhasamulti-partysystem.
Source: http://africa.govt.harvard.edu.
Coup, risk of
This variable was calculated using the model of coup d’´ etat presented in
Collier and Hoefﬂer (2005).
Resource rich   Competitive parties
Interaction between two dummy variables, one taking the value of 1 if the
countryisresource-rich(and0otherwise)andtheothertakingonthevalue
1i f the country has a multi-party system (and 0 otherwise).
Rule by fear   ethnic diversity
Interaction between a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if authority is
highlyconcentratedinapoliticalleaderwho“rulesbyfear”(and0otherwise)
and the Fearon index of ethnic diversity.
Post-1989
Dummy variable taking a value of 1 for 1990 and later years.416 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
References
Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson (2001), “Inefﬁcient Redistribution,”
American Political Science Review 95: 649–61
Adam,ChristopherS.andStephenA.O’Connell(1999),“Aid,Taxation,andDevel-
opment in sub-Saharan Africa,” Economics and Politics 11: 225–54
Alesina, Alberto, Reza Baqir, and William Easterley (1999), “Public Goods and
Ethnic Divisions,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114: 1243–84
Allen, Chris (1989), “Benin,” in C. Allen, M. S. Radu, K. Somerville, and J. Baxter,
Benin, the Congo, Burkina Fasu: Economics, Politics, and Society. London and
NewY ork: Pinter
Azam, Jean-Paul and Alice Mesnard (2003), “Civil War and the Social Contract,”
Public Choice 115: 455–75
Bates, Robert H. (1981), Markets and States in Tropical Africa. Berkeley, CA and Los
Angeles, CA: University of California Press
Bates, Robert H. and Irene Yackolev (2002), “Ethnicity in Africa,” in C. Grootaert
andT.vanBastelaer,eds.,TheRoleofSocialCapitalinDevelopment.NewYork:
Cambridge University Press
Becker, Gary S. (1983), “A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for
Political Inﬂuence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 98: 371–400
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson, and James Morrow
(2003), The Logic of Political Survival.C ambridge, MA: MIT Press
Collier, Paul (2000), “Ethnicity, Politics, and Economic Performance,” Economics
and Politics 12: 225–45
Collier,PaulandAnkeHoefﬂer(2005),“GrandExtortionCoupRiskandtheMilitary
as a Protection Racket,” University of Oxford, mimeo
Dahl, Robert (1971), Polyarchy.N e wH a ven, CT: Yale University Press
Easterly, William and Ross Levine (1997), “Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies and
Ethnic Divisions,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112: 1203–50
Fearon, James (2003), “Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Growth 8(2): 195–222
Fearon,JamesD.andDavidD.Laitin(1996),“ExplainingInterethnicCooperation,”
American Political Science Review 90: 715–35
(2003), “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War,” American Political Science Review
97: 75–90
Honaker, James (2000), “Issues in Multiple Imputation of Data of the African
Research Program,” Department of Government, Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University
Huband,Mark(2001),TheSkullbeneaththeSkin:AfricaaftertheColdWar.Boulder,
CO: Westview Press
Humphreys, Macartan and Robert H. Bates (2005), “Political Institutions and Eco-
nomic Policies: Lessons from Africa,” British Journal of Political Science 35:
403–28
Iyoha, Milton A. and Dickson E. Oriakhi (2007), “Explaining African Economic
Growth Performance: The Case of Nigeria,” chapter 18 in Benno J. Ndulu,
StephenA.O’Connell,Jean-PaulAzam,RobertH.Bates,AugustinKwasiFosu,
JanW illem Gunning, and Dominique Njinkeu, eds., The Political Economy ofEndogenizing syndromes 417
Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000,v ol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press
Kasekende, Louis A. and Michael Atingi-Ego (2007), “Restarting and Sustaining
Growth in a Post-conﬂict Economy: The Case of Uganda,” chapter 8 in Benno
J. Ndulu, Stephen A. O’Connell, Jean-Paul Azam, Robert H. Bates, Augustin
Kwasi Fosu, Jan Willem Gunning, and Dominique Njinkeu, eds., The Political
Economy of Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000,v ol. 2. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press
Kasﬁr, Nelson (1976), The Shrinking Political Arena.B erkeley, CA and Los Angeles,
CA: University of California Press
King, Gary, Michael Tomz, and Jason Wittenberg (2000), “Making the Most of
Statistical Analyses,” American Journal of Political Science 44: 347–61
Mwanawina, Inyambo and James Mulungushi (2007), “Zambia,” chapter 27 in
Benno J. Ndulu, Stephen A. O’Connell, Jean-Paul Azam, Robert H. Bates,
AugustinKwasiFosu,JanWillemGunning,andDominiqueNjinkeu,eds.,The
Political Economy of Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000,v ol. 2. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press
Nkurunziza, Janvier and Floribert Ngaruki (2007), “Why Has Burundi Grown so
Slowly?ThePoliticalEconomyofRedistribution,”chapter2inBennoJ.Ndulu,
StephenA.O’Connell,Jean-PaulAzam,RobertH.Bates,AugustinKwasiFosu,
JanW illem Gunning, and Dominique Njinkeu, eds., The Political Economy of
Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000,v ol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press
Norris, Pippa and Robert Mattes (2003), “Does Ethnicity Determine Support for
the Governing Party?,” The John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University, Cambridge, MA
Nzongola-Ntanlaja, Georges (2002), The Congo from Leopold to Kabila.L o n d o n :
Zed Books
Olson, Mancur (1977), The Logic of Collective Action.C ambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press
Penn, Elizabeth Maggie (2006), “Citizenship versus Ethnicity: The Role of Insti-
tutions in Shaping Identity Choice,” Institute for Quantitative Social Science,
Department of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA
Posner, Daniel (2005), Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa.N e wY o rk and
London: Cambridge University Press
Roeder, Philip (1993), Red Sunset.P r inceton, NJ: Princeton University Press
Ross,Mark(2003),“TheNaturalResourceCurse,”inI.BannonandP.Collier,eds.,
Natural Resources and Violent Conﬂict.W ashington, DC: The World Bank
Rothchild,DonaldandVictorOlorunsula,eds.(1983),StatevsEthnicClaims.Boul-
der, CO: Westview Press
Rubin,D.B.(1996),“MultipleImputationafter18+Years(withDiscussion),”Jour-
nal of the American Statistical Association 91: 473–89
Sachs, Jeffrey D. and Andrew M. Warner (1995), “Natural Resource Abundance
and Economic Growth,” National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., NEBR
Working Papers 5398418 Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000
Schafer, Joseph L. (1997), “Imputation of Missing Covariates in the Multivariate
LinearMixedModel,”DepartmentofStatistics,UniversityPark,PA:ThePenn-
sylvania State University
Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1950), Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York:
Harper & Row
Werbner,Richard(1993),“FromHeartlandtoHinterland:ElitesandtheGeopolitics
ofLandinBotswana,”inT.J.BassettandD.E.Crummey,eds.,LandinAfrican
Agrarian Systems.M adison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press
Zakaria,Fareed(1997),“TheRiseofIlliberalDemocracy,”ForeignAffairs 76:22–43
Zolberg, Aristide (1966), Creating Political Order: The Party States of West Africa.
Chicago: Rand McNally